THE FIGHTING SHIITE MILITIAS IN SYRIA
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The Syrian revolution began on March 2011 and radically changed the accumulated and silenced-on factors in the Syrian equation. The political opposition insured to present itself as a representative of all the sectarian groups in the Syrian society which was affirmed through demonstrations in the sectarian-sensitive areas and the names of the Fridays that were chosen via a public polls that were posted on the Syrian revolution Facebook pages. On the other side, many activists’ testimonies, who belong to families of minorities, illustrated the nature and magnitude of the terrifying and massing policies that were adopted, and still being adopted, by the regime in the first months in the minorities areas through spreading rumors about Takfiri groups’ attempt to slaughter the Alawites or Christians (before the appearance of the armed groups in the revolution), inciting the sectarian differences using religious leaders, accusing the Syrian revolution of Sectarianism even in the official media, and by practicing continuously symbolic violence against the rural Sunni society as a part of a massing blind propaganda that helped in spreading the sectarian discourse and legalizing it even by the secular elites who sided themselves with the authority. This established a complex sectarian structure that included even the level of the secular authority-independent elites. The Syrian regime adopted a secular discourse, which was subliminal often and clear in some cases. What contributed in dedicating and forcing the regime to use the sectarian traits of the regime regional goals which led to many disagreement with the various regional Sunni major entities such as the Turkish-Qatari center or the Saudi center. Consequently, the Syrian case became an arena for the regional-sectarian conflicts.

The Syrian regime tried from the beginning to highlight a sectarian terrorism characteristics in the revolution where it used media and political provocative discourses. Furthermore, it perpetrat-ed tens of massacres in sectarian-sensitive areas in order to have reactions that would validate its claims about the sectarian nature of the popular revolution and use it to scare minorities of the protests as an attempt to affirm its legitimacy as a secular regime that protects minorities from the terrorist Takfiri gangs. Within its security and military structure, the regime hired Iranian experts even before the revolution; those Iranian Revolutionary Guards experts and leaders helped with suppressing the popular protests and supported the Syrian regime materially, Logistically, and even military. The numerous defection cases made the regime resorts even more to such methods. The geographical, military, and numerical expansion of the opposition, beside the shrinkage of the regime army members number whether it was due to the human losses during battles, the numerous defection cases, the opposition taking over gas and oil areas and other supply resources, the disruption of the Iraqi situation and the Shiite taking over important positions in the state, the Iranian attempts to keep the Syrian regime as a leverage card in its negotiations with the West and as a part of its domestic project that expand to reach Hezbollah in Lebanon in addition to the grossing sectarian speech that was used to describe the Syrian revolution inside Syrian and abroad. All these factors forced the Syrian regime to ask for the help of foreign Shiite forces in his fight against the opposition and oppressing the popular demonstrations. The first signs of military Shiite existence began to surface at the end of 2011 when the rebels arrested fighters who were affiliated to Jaish Al-Mahdi Mahdi which operates under the command of the Shiite leader Muqtada As-Sadr. Many reports suggested that As-Sad sent fighter to Syria despite him publically denying these allegations until recently. Nevertheless, the most notable turn of events on this matter was in the summer of 2012 when Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade appeared. Additionally, there were a lot of calls for Shiias to fight in Syria to protect the Shiite shrines and specifically As-Sayda Zainab shrine in conjunction with a massing propaganda adopted by many daily newspapers, TV channels, and social media. With time, more and more Shiite fights came to Syria to fight with Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade. Hezbollah started publically fighting in April 2013 in Al-Qusayr and its countryside which was another development in the existence of Shiite militia in Syria where more Shiite factions started fighting more openly in Syria. This suggested that there were many Shiite political and military forces fighting with the Syrian regime even the Iraq government who facilitated the entry of fighters into Syria in addition to evidences that it itself have actually participated in the conflict. While the majority of fighters who are fighting with the Syrian regime based on sectarian reasons are Iraqis and Lebanese, many fighters from other nationalities such as Afghans, Pakistanis, Yemenis, and even African nationalities were documented to be fighting with the Syrian regime.
The purpose of this important study that took five months to be finished and were accorded to our large archive:

First: To introduce the fighting Shiite faction that re-fighting with the Syrian regime, its ideological background, its regional affiliations, and its sectarian massing propaganda. These faction are accused, as well as the Syrian regime, of perpetrating Human Rights violations that can be openly classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes whom the Syrian regime documented tens of.

Second: To urge the International Community to include these militias in the Terrorism List the same as ISIS and Jabhat An-Nussra as all these militias' atrocious practices can be referred to as terrorist acts.

Recruiting Shiite fighters depends on two ways: financial temptation and sectarian massing. Despite the many mercenaries among the Shiite fighting groups in Syria, the majority of them are still volunteers as a result of the intense sectarian massing propaganda adopted by platforms that support the fighting in Syria from mosques, Hussainias, TV channels, magazines and newspapers, to the social media (Facebook, YouTube, and forums.)

Massing methods depend on the direct calling for fight, artistic designs, or filmed songs with battles backgrounds. The designs concentrate on the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab with the red flag risen on it, which indicates to “not taking revenge” yet and comes usually with the phrase: “Zaynab won’t be captured twice” as a reference to her first capture on the hands of the Omayyad ruler Yazeed ben Moay’a after the famous battle of Karbala. This incident is the establishment of the narrative of the Shiite sufferings until now. Also, Karbala is the battle in which Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas, whom the first Shiite brigade was named after, was killed. In these filmed songs, phrases about demolishing FSA are repeated sometimes. Also, the lyrics include sometimes aggressive sectarian phrases referring to Sunnis, such as: Nasibis, Takfiris, and Wahhabis, and calling to crush them and protect Sayyidah Zaynab shrine from them.

The speeches of the Shiite political and religious leaders about Syria contributed in the legalization of the fighting there and increased the sectarian hatred, especially Lebanese Shiite leader Hasan Nasrallah, in addition to other Shiite religious leaders who field-visit the fighting Shiite militias to motivate the fighters or participate in the fight themselves sometimes.

The massing among the Shiite groups concentrates mainly on Sayyidah Zainab area in Southern Damascus whose thousands of their fighters participate as fighters in these battles. The role of the Iraqi Shiite militia has been fundamental in the fight in Aleppo since the beginning of June 2013, when Abo Al-Fada Al-Abbas brigade then Ammar ben Yaser brigade mainly participated in restoring Khamars town and the support road with rocket cover by the regime forces which participated with armored and infantry battalions until they restored the control of Khamars. This control was followed by taking the two Shiite towns of Nobbol and Az-Zahraa in the Northern countryside.

The participation of the Shiite groups extended to the south to Daraa, where they fought with the Syrian regime or the armed committees made by it in the areas which include Shiite families (such as Busra Al-Sham.)

Also, they extended north to Aleppo, when the first non-Syrian Shiite groups’ appearance was in the beginning of February 2013, when forces of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards participated in the fighting with the Syrian regime forces in raiding Aleppo Southern countryside via Khanasr gate and broke the siege of the Defense factories and reached Aleppo and An-Nayrab airports. There was an attempt to reach the two Shiite towns of Nobbol and Az-Zahraa in the Northern countryside.

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Originally, most of the Shiite fighting groups existed in Sayyidah Zainab area in Southern Damascus before they spread to other areas as it has been considered the base area of massing since the summer of 2012. The existence of these groups doesn’t is not limited to this area. It extends where these groups takes part in sieging the near neighborhoods of Southern Damascus and fighting in Damascus countryside, where the Airport battle at the beginning of 2013 took place. This battle was one of the most and important battles which these groups participated in. They reached Eastern Ghouta as they participated in sieging the areas which have been hit with the chemical weapons on 21 May 2013 to stop any escaping attempt by the residents. Also, it was documented that they participated in raiding battles in Damascus countryside followed by extrajudicial killings and field-executions mostly in An-Nabak. The participation of the Shiite groups extended to the south to Daraa, where they fought with the Syrian regime or the armed committees made by it in the areas which include Shiite families (such as Busra Al-Sham.)

Also, they extended north to Aleppo, when the first non-Syrian Shiite groups’ appearance was in the beginning of February 2013, when forces of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards participated in the fighting with the Syrian regime forces in raiding Aleppo Southern countryside via Khanasr gate and broke the siege of the Defense factories and reached Aleppo and An-Nayrab airports. There was an attempt to reach the two Shiite towns of Nobbol and Az-Zahraa in the Northern countryside.

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There is no doubt that the military and security cooperation between the Syrian and Iranian regimes was before the Syrian revolution on all levels, from training to weapons support. Many evidences were found on the existence of Iranian Revolutionary Guards officers in the battling areas or in the training camps as technical experts or battles participants. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards takes part in training and supporting most of the Iraqi Shiite groups which fight in Syria, considering that a big portion of it emerged in the conflict between Saddam Hussein regime and the Iranian regime (the Higher Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq whose headquarters was in Tehran for example).

It was in the first half of 2013 when official funerals for killed fighters from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were seen. In the same period Abo Al-Fadl Abdullah Iskandari by Al-Nusra Front in Morak which has the ability to observe movements in distant areas (5 km). It should be noted that the official Syria Army support these militias with tanks and the availability to use its heavy weapons by them under mutual coordination. The use of war helicopters to shell areas, such as Aleppo and Ghouta, with barrel bombs by Iraqi militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel has been documented.

The weapon system among the Shiite fighting militias, especially Iraqi, is similar given that the source of the arming and training is the same which is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the experts of Hezbollah in some cases. It should be noted that Shiite militias’ personnel are equipped with semi-unified military uniforms and with semi-fully military equipment because of the partnership between most of these militias with the Iraqi army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Also, the logo of SWAT forces and other forces affiliated to the official Iraqi army were noticed on the uniforms of some these groups which implies the involvement of the Iraqi army in the conflict in Syria or groups affiliated of it which the structure of the Iraqi Army, whom the Shiite militias were integrated into, allows.

The armament system is based mainly on the following weapons: RPG-7s, PKM, AK-47, M16, and Steyr HS.50, in addition to mortar cannons, 23 mm and 14.5 machine guns, multiple rocket launchers, and Gvozdika cannons owned by Al-Hand Brigade affiliated to Hezbollah Al-Nojaba in Aleppo. This weapon system also includes surface to surface rockets of the type Borkan (Volcano) and Zelzal (Earthquake), which have been used in shelling many areas in Ghouta, Qalamon, and Deraa, beside anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) like Konkurs and Metis, and using advanced Night Vision Devices (NVD’s) which has the ability to observe movements in distant areas (5 km). It should be noted that the official Syrian Army support these militias with tanks and the availability to use its heavy weapons by them under mutual coordination. The use of war helicopters to shell areas, such as Aleppo and Ghouta, with barrel bombs by Iraqi militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel has been documented.
Yabrud battle in February and March 2014 was February 2014. campaign to raid Al-Qalamoun and Yabroud in its climax when it announced a large military militias. Hezbollah’s involvement reached the Syrian regime forces and the Iraqi Shiite battles in Damascus countryside supporting After Qusair battle, the faction took part in course of the Syrian conflict.

tillery shelling on Qusair countryside over the regime was before that through the unannounced-2013, the military and logistic support of the re-Hezbollah was announced in Qusair battle in April-2013, the official participating of Hez-though the faction took part in battles in Damascus supporting the Syrian regime forces and the Iraqi Shiite militias, Hezbollah’s involvement reached its climax when it announced a large military campaign to raid Al-Qalamoun and Yabroud in February 2014.

Yabrud battle in February and March 2014 was a crucial point in Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian battle where the party took the control and management of the battle and didn’t allow the Syrian regime to participate except through artillery and aerial support as all the infantry forces was non-Syrian where most of them were Lebanese in addition to Iraqi and Afghani militias who were first defense lines in most battles as “cheap blood”.

The faction lost in Syria no less than 300 victim according to the estimations of the Syrian opposition. The number of its fighters in Syria is estimated to be approximately 7-10 thousands fighter. The party depends recently on the recruitment of the younger volunteers to cover the losses. Leaders and experts from the party are present in most of the fronts even when most of the fighters are Iraqi to manage the battle or preserve higher levels of planning and discipline.

Lebanese Hezbollah

Lebanese Hezbollah is considered the closest group to the Iranian regime and the Syrian regime together, the most trained and best armed Shiite force outside Iran. The most symbolic Shiite force after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and the biggest human and military flowing to Syria compared to its size, which can be seen by the big number of its victims whose funerals were in the Lebanese South. Even though the official participating of Hezbollah was announced in Qusair battle in April 2013, the military and logistic support of the regime was before that through the unannounced involvement by infantry or by rocket and artillery shelling on Qusair countryside over the course of the Syrian conflict.

After Qusair battle, the faction took part in battles in Damascus supporting the Syrian regime forces and the Iraqi Shiite militias. Hezbollah’s involvement reached its climax when it announced a large military campaign to raid Al-Qalamoun and Yabroud in February 2014.

Yabrud battle in February and March 2014 was
**Tho Al-Faqar Brigade**

The Brigade emerged in June 2013 and was the first announced independent force of the Shiite Iraqis in Syria and began in what looks like a defection or organizational independence from Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas brigade. The founders of the brigade were fighters with Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas brigade who are: Fadel Sobhi, also known as Abu Hajar and he was killed in the clashes, and Abo Shahd Al-Jboory the current brigade leader. The brigade included in its establishment fighters from Jaish Al-Mahdi and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) mainly and it kept extending after its finding. Tho Al-Faqar brigade fights in Sayyidah Zaynab area and participated in the battles of Airport Road and Adra city. It also participated in raiding An-Nabuk and in the massacre which was committed there against residents which can be classified as crimes against humanity. Some images of the leader Abo Shahd Al-Jboory executing prisoners and civilians was published, which the brigade loyalists cared to spread it to affirm the picture of the tough merciless leader and this character of Abo Shahd has been popular and being used within the terrifying propaganda.

The coordination between Tho Al-Faqar Brigade and Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade manifested even after the announcing on various levels such as the operations, command, or even pictures of their victims. This cooperation between Shiite groups in Syria was as result of the nested structure with Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade and as a result of its necessary sectarian unity due to the sectarian conflict logic against the other Sunni.

**Iraq Hezbollah Brigades**

Hezbollah Brigades first appeared in 2006 as one of the Shiite groups that adopt operations against the American forces, while its leaders say that the roots of this organization is older than this date and the American forces resistance goes back to 2003 before it was formalized under its recent name. The brigade adopted the slogan “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq” the parallel of the Lebanese same-named slogan (Hezb36ollah – the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon). This slogan following many Shiite groups carries a significance of the closing of the Iranian government, the supporter of most armed big Shiite groups. In March 2013 the brigades spokesmen announced that they’ll fight anyone who is trying to “weaken” Bashar Assad regime, and in the same month it started intensely to announce the names of its victims in Syria without official admission where obituary statements on their death were published in this form “during the duty of the doctrine and dignity” and “defending the holy landscapes”. The brigades were the first to announce the names of its victims among the Iraqi Shiite groups.

In June 2013 the brigades confirmed sending fighters to Syria to defend the holy landscapes and to fight the American Saudi project. It’s seems that the brigades fighters were fighting under the leadership of Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas brigade at the beginning, and it continued to assume a “father” role even after the emergence of pure Iraqi groups, where the victims obituary statements show that the fighters were fighting under many brigades leadership affiliated to Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas brigade, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), or else. The leader Hashim Al-Hamadany, also known as Abu Alaa’, is the one who leads the brigades and organizes the matters on the ground in Syria. The brigades had faced many defections and divisions in Iraq, most notably was the defection of Abo Mostafa Al-Shaybany who organized Sayid Ash-Shohada’ Brigades and moved to fight in Syria, where he receives fighters of his group or another groups who want to fight in Syria, as what we mentioned previously that the differences melt when it come to fighting the “other Sunni”.

**Sayid Ash-Shohada’ (Master of the Martyrs) Brigades**

Sayid Ash-Shohada’ Brigades was formed in April 2013 in Iraq after conflicts between Iraq Hezbollah leaders ended with the defection of Abo Mostafa Al-Shaybany which to forming these brigades. (It should be noted that Abo Mostafa Al-Shaybany has both of the Iranian and Iraqi nationalities). And as soon as he moved to Syria in the ends of May of the same year as what seems an Iranian directing to intake the internal Shiite conflicts by directing it to the Syrian arena.

The brigades operation as a stable group to fight in Syria started to surface in August 2013 when the Brigades participated in the battles in Sayyidah Zaynab town in addition to the Eastern Ghouta battles. In 24 August 2013 the Brigades announced victims or (missing) in the Eastern Ghouta in Damascus countryside where they were fighting on the touch lines with the Syrian opposition knowing that on 21 August, the chemical weapons were used to hit Eastern Ghouta which indicates the unplanned extension of the chemical effect to the areas of the official army forces and the brigades forces whose mission, between the regime control areas and opposition forces control area, to prevent any escaping or sneaking attempts FROM the besieged Ghouta areas.

On 1 August 2013 the Brigades announced another number of victims in Eastern Ghouta, and a series of huge funerals in the Iraqi cities of the Brigades victims took place in the later which indicates the loss sustained by the Brigades especially in Eastern Ghouta and indicates, at the same time, the huge flow of fighters.

Also, it shows the close relationship between the Brigades and Badr Organization- the Military Wing and as well as Iran Hezbollah, the origin group.

**Martyr Mohammad Baqer As-Sadr Forces – Badr Organization military wing**

Badr organization is the closest organization to the Iranian regime. The organization’s logo is the same as the Iranian Revolutionary guards’.

Badr corps was founded in 1980. Mohammad Baqer Al-Hakim, assassinated in 2003, was the main Shiite figure and the head of the High Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Al-Hakim was one of its founders under the supervision of the Iranian Regime and former leader of the Iranian revolution Aytoollah Khomeini. Baqar was the military wing of the political opposition in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Saddam Hussein fought this opposition recklessly with vicious campaigns of arrest, killing, and assassination which even reached the highest Shiite religious leader and the founder of Ad-Da’wa party Mohammad Baqar As-Sad which forced most of the members and leaders to go back to Iran.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Badr corps became Badr organization and affirmed that construction and development are its highest priority. However, the military wing continued functioning. The organization, along with Hezbollah, Ali Al-Haq, Jaish Al-Mahdi, sent fighters to Syria upon the emergence of Abdulaffadl Al-Abbas brigade to fight under its command and later under the command of Tho Al-Faqar and Sayed Ash-Shihada factions. Subsequently, the organization decided to participate in the Syrian conflict which was followed by the creation of an independent force under the name of “The Organization.”

In June, 2013 the Organization announced officially that one of its fighters: “Yassin Mahmoud Az-Zain” was killed while guarding As-Sayda Zainab shrine in Damascus. A few days later the Organization’s secretary-general announced that his forces are indeed fighting in Syria.

On 21 July, 2013, the organization said that one of its leader “Abu-Thar Al- The media activist’oudi” was killed while fighting in Syria. A few days later “Martyr Mohammad Baqer As-Sadr Forces” was founded. Badr organization forces operates primarily in As-Sayda Zainab’s town and southern Damascus in addition to participating in the clashes in Eastern Ghouta and the airport highway. Its members are relatively well-armed. Furthermore, they were trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Badr has approximately 1500-2000 fighter in Syria who work under the command of Mohammad Baqer As-Sad and other factions.
Kafif Zainab brigade – Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq

Kafif Zainab’s roots go back to Jaish Al-Mahdi the military representative of Sadrist Movement and the Shiite factions that emerged after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Initially, it operated as a part of groups that were affiliated to the religious leader Qais Al-Khaz’lie (current secretary-general of the faction). And after a disagreement with the leader of the Sadrist Movement Muqtada As-Sadr, he split up from Jaish Al-Mahdi in 2009 and formed Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq.

It was no secret that Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq was involved in forming Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade despite it never officially announced that until 2013 when Al-Khaz’lie announced that its forces are fighting in Syria where he assured that they are not fighting to protect Al-Assad regime whom he referred to as authoritarian. Al-Khaz’lie said that they are fighting based on ideological reasons such as protecting the Shiite shrines in Syria and preventing the Wahhabi movement from getting into Iraq.

The most notable turn of events for the Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq was in June, 2013 when Kafif Zainab was formed which was in conjunction with a visit by leaders of the faction and Shiite religious leaders to the faction’s fighters in Syria such as the Shiite religious leader Mohammad At-Tababa’ie before Al-Khaz’lie himself visited the fighters in September 2013.

According to some of the faction’s fighters who were arrested by the Syrian opposition, the faction is paying high wages for its fighters who are fighting in Syria. This allowed the faction to recruit militias and fight in more areas such as the airport highway and Eastern Ghouta besides As-Sayda Zainab.

It is obvious that Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq’s involvement in the Syrian conflict played a significant role in supporting the Shiite military power in Syria. Pumping more military and fighters into Syria was vital part of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq plan as it is now one of the greatest Iraqi-Shiite faction who are fighting in Syria.

The presence of the Shiite factions in Syria is associated with the Asa’ib’s support to the Iraqi regime, its authoritarian. Al-Khaz’lie said that they are fighting based on ideological reasons such as protecting the Shiite shrines and preventing the Wahhabi movement from getting into Iraq. The faction’s emergence was in conjunction with Hezbollah battle in Qusayr in Homs countryside. The first killed fighter was had his funeral at the beginning of June 2013 in My-san – Iraq followed by more fighters. Since its beginning, the faction has been demonstrating relatively high levels of professionalism in the military and media fields. His fighters only appear in their full gear.

The brigade fought mainly in Aleppo countryside, between the Iraqi government and these faction. This faction is evidently the smallest newest group from Abulfadl Al-Abbas. The faction fights mainly in As-Sayda Zainab and Eastern Ghouta in addition to the possibility that the faction was involved with Lebanese Hezbollah in Qusyar in Homs countryside.

The brigade was the first to divide its fighters military as it announced the establishment of Al-Ashtar battalions, the martyr Ahmad Kayyara, founder of Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade, troops. Pictures published on the brigade’s pages show fighters wearing the official Iraqi armi uniform which implies the unofficial coordination between the Iraqi government and this faction. The core of this brigade formed later the rapid intervention squad whom Jaish Al-Mahdi relies on in his unannounced military wing “Al-Mou’mal Brigade.”

Al-Hamad brigade

This faction is evidently the smallest newest within An-Nujaba’ movement. It carried out limited operation starting July, 2013. The first funeral for its fighters was in My-san – Southern Iraq in November 2013. However, his operation expanded after it acquired rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles.

Hezbollah An-Nujaba’ Movement

Emerged after a defection by the leader in Asa’ib and deputy secretary-general Akram Al-Ka’bi who participated along with his fighters in the clashes in Syria. The Iranian regime, apparently, has dealt with dispute within Asa’ib using the same approach it used with the Iraqi Hezbollah battalions where it supported Sayed Ash-Shuhada battalions’ involvement in Syria and it supports now the religious leader Akram Al-Ka’bi in Syria. The movement consisted originally of some of Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade’s groups or other groups who deserted Abulfadl Al-Abbas brigade before it started sending fighters independently after securing financial support in addition to having its fighters trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Lebanese faction Hezbollah.

The faction has three affiliated brigades as follows:
Al-Wa’d As-Sadeq corps

Was formed in 2006, the year in which many Shiite faction were formed after 2006 Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel. The faction emerged after disagreements between Jaish Al-Mahdi and the Sadrist Movement whom the faction is affiliated to. The faction adopts more modest beliefs that the beliefs of Muqtada As-Sadr leader of Jaish Al-Mahdi and in the same time its closer to the Iranian regime. The faction, as the other Shiite groups who are allied the Iranian regime, adopts the slogan “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.”

The leader is Mohammad Hamza Al-Tamimi (Abu-Al An-Najafi). The faction, according to its description on its official website, exists in 11 Iraqi governorates and have a cultural and media divisions in addition to its military involvement which was mostly, before Syria, against the American forces according to their website. The faction remained inactive starting in 2010 until it remerged in Syria.

The media activism of the faction is more mysterious or scarce which can be seen in Syria more than Iraq. Its involvement is part of the context of Iranian regime’s motivation to the faction related to it to fight in Syria in addition to the massing propaganda.

The first appearance was in September 2013. Most of the faction’s operations were carried out in Damascus countryside and Al-Qalamoun in addition to some photos, sent to SNHR, that show the faction fighters in Aleppo. We don’t have any information about the number of fighters that the faction has. But the several photos that show different groups in different areas in addition to the Iranian support make us believe that the faction’s fighters exceed hundreds.

Assadillah Al-Ghaleb Brigade

The establishment of the brigade was announced through a poorly-produced video in front of Damascus airport in December 2013. In the video there is a guy who wears the logo of “Rapid Intervention Forces” and called “Abu-Fatima Al-Mosouli” and he is close to the Shiite religious leader Qassem Al-Ta’ie. The faction’s operation is mostly in As-Shiena in Damascus countryside in addition to As-Syada Zainab.

The semi-official clothing and armament of the faction personnel suggests that some of the fighters are members of the official Iraqi security forces. Also, the brigade includes smaller squads that exist only in media as it has a few fighters on the ground (Ali Al-Akbar battalion for instance). This faction is smaller than the aforementioned faction. However, its leader Abu-Fatima Al-Mosouli is well-known as “one of the heroes that protect the shrines.”

Al-Imam Al-Hussein brigade

Damascus countryside and Aleppo. It is commanded by ‘Amjad Al-Bhadli’. Most of the photos concentrate on showing KG-7 launchers. The relationship between this faction and Muqtada As-Sadar’s Jaish Al-Mahdi is clear. This group was a part of Abdulfadl Al-Abbas brigade before it got separated and expanded.

Rapid Intervention Squad

Despite the name of this faction, its numbers are less than An-Nujabaa, Asa’ib, or Badr corps. Basically, “Ahmad Al-Haji As-Sa’die”, who was close to the founder of Abdulfadl Al-Abbas brigade, is the leader of this faction. After Kayyara was killed As-Sa’die formed the Iranian Al-Mujtaba brigade which became affiliated later to An-Nujabaa’ then he formed the Rapid Intervention Squad (SWAT) which is affiliated to the Iraqi army. Its fighters are originally from these forces probably. As-Sa’die was appointed a military leader of Al-Mu’ammal brigade, the first announced military wing for Jaish Al-Mahdi in Syria, this group operated mostly in As-Syada Zainab, the airport highway, and Damascus countryside. Even though this group don’t have many fighters, its leader are known as heroes that protect the shrines especially the community close to Muqtada As-Sadr who sponsor the activism of As-Sa’die and his companions.

‘Jaish Al-Mahdi – Al-Mu’ammal brigade

Despite the fact that Muqtada As-Sadr kept denying any involvement in Syria until late in 2013, there were many evidences that prove that Jaish Al-Mahdi played a central role in establishing Iraqi Shiite militias in Syria through individual fighters since late 2011 then through Abdulfadl Al-Abbas brigade in the summer of 2012 and then through supporting and establishing independent Iraqi militias since the spring of 2013 (such as Al-Hussein Brigade, Rapid Intervention Squad, Thu-Al-Fa’aq Brigade…) which can be seen clearly in the frequent visits by Aws Al-Khfaji, director of As-Sadr office, to Syria and his pictures with militias let alone the open loyalty of the fighters to Jaish Al-Mahdi. It should be noted that Jaish Al-Mahdi fighters are well-known for perpetrating sectarian violations in a brutal manner in Iraq. The involvement reached its climax when the official announcement was made in May, 2014 to “protect the holy shrines”. Ahmad Al-Haji As-Sa’die was the military leader. The faction will not only use new fighters but will rely also on faction that are close to Jaish Al-Mahdi in Syria even with the most recent developments in Iraq which startled the Shiites and could delay –or end- the current brigade’s involvement in Syria.

East-Asian groups and various nationalities

Hazara Afghanis and Shiite Pakistanis are the majority of the non-Arab or Iranian Shiite fighters in Syria as they are easier to recruit and cost less. The Afghani fighters in Syria are no less than 5,000; most of whom are being recruited from the Afghani refugees in Iran. The Iranian government doesn’t uphold its material and symbolic obligations the detained Iranian fighters –or their bodies-. Those fighters are being recruited within mixed faction such as Abufadl Al-Abbas and especially Tal’at Al-Kharsani Battalions or within pure Afghani faction under an Iranian command such as Fatimiyyoun Brigade. Furthermore, some of the residents found killed fighters that belong to other Eastern-Asian nationalities in Aleppo countryside and Damascus countryside in addition to Yemeni Houthis and African fighters whom were confirmed killed on Shiite faction pages. These groups fights usually within Iraqi groups and don’t have private forces for them.
The aforenamed of the most significant ethnic cleansing incidents in Damascus countryside were perpetrated by Shiite militias that had explicit sectarian cleansing nature where slaughtering, bodies disfiguring, and sexual violence were highly noticeable. SNHR was able to document a limited number of these violations considering the difficulty to find eyewitnesses whether due to the fact that the Syrian regime and militias control the areas where these violations were perpetrated, or because the eyewitnesses have been displaced, disappeared, or were killed.

**Damascus countryside**

**Athaybiya massacre**

The most notable massacre in Damascus countryside was Athaybiya massacre that took place on 8 October, 2013 and lasted for three days. 13 family members have been killed and forcibly disappeared in this massacre. SNHR has already documented the details in a separate report entitled “the military campaign against Athaybiya town has a sectarian cleansing's nature” http://sn4hr.org/blog/2013/10/10/the-military-campaign-against-athaybiya-town-in-damascus-countryside-has-a-sectarian-cleansing-nature/

1. **“Mistou, Aloush, and Al-Qraa’” families.** SNHR was able to verify this massacre on 7 December, 2013 where residents found 28 dead bodies of these families including 17 children and seven ladies. Many of the corpses were burned and disfigured in a brutal manner in addition to systemic looting. Below is the most notable massacres that SNHR was able to document. It should be noted that there were many massacres that we couldn’t document because of the Syrian regime’s and militias’ siege. Most of the massacres were around and inside Al-Fattah neighborhood in the western side of the city near Al-Qalamoun University. According to residents’ testimonies and our investigations, the massacres were perpetrated by Thu Al-Faqar brigade that were identified through their dialect and clothes.

2. **“Al-Adib, Ismail, Al-Khabbaz, and Al-Abd” families.** SNHR was able to verify this massacre on 9 December, 2013 where residents found 27 dead bodies including eight children and 11 ladies in addition to a number of elderlies that were killed. Many corpses were burned and disfigured. The massacre took place in Al-Fattah neighborhood specifically behind the fried chicken restaurant.

3. **“Khazma and Bannot” families from Damascus.** SNHR verified the massacre on 14 December, 2013 and documented the killing of 12 civilians including two children and seven ladies. The massacre took place in Al-Amin Street.

4. **“Hassoun and Mousa Hassan” families.** SNHR was able to verify the killing of 10 December, 2013 where residents found 45 dead bodies including 14 children and 16 ladies who were burned to death and then sprayed with a chemical substance we believe it was (white phosphorus). The bodies were thrown on the highway next to the bank specifically behind As-Sanwbrat Park.

5. **“As-Saloua’” family.** SNHR documented the killing of 16 people in this massacre including nine children and five ladies on 11 December, 2013. The bodies were thrown on the highway next to the bank specifically behind As-Sanwbrat Park.

6. **“Al-Aghwani” family.** SNHR documented the killing of nine civilians on 12 December, 2013 including three children and eight ladies in the western neighborhood.

7. **“Khazma and Bannot” families from Damascus.** SNHR verified the massacre on 14 December, 2013 and documented the killing of 12 civilians including two children and seven ladies. The massacre took place in Al-Amin Street.

8. **Shiite militias have executed in this massacre 45 victims at least; most of whom were women, children, and elderlies who were internally displaced from Qusair and Homs. Residents informed the network of the massacre long after the other massacres on 18 December, 2013.** It should be noted that residents have found two carbonized bodies near Al-Gharib villa on Der Attya road front of Al-Fattah neighborhood where the Iraqi brigade Thu Al-Faqar advanced from.

9. **On 27 December, 2013 some of Al-Qastal residents, located on the highway, tried to flee but a landmine, which was apparently implanted by the Syrian regime, exploded and exposed them. Government forces opened fire using artillery shelling and helicopters to kill 23 people who were mostly children and women.**
In Aleppo, Shiite militias have perpetrated many massacres and violations in several areas. SNHR has collected testimonies suggesting the presence of these militias in Aleppo.

### Shiite militias’ existence

1. **Ash-Shaikh Najjar front**

   SNHR talked with a rebel who was fighting on the front called (Hassan H) under the command of Fajr Ash-Sham movement. On 14 May, 2014, opposition forces managed to regain control over Mejbal Ash-Shaikh Najjar after an operation whom multiple rebel factions participated in. In the morning we attacked the mountain from three points. The Syrian regime retaliated with airstrikes but because we were close to the location of the Syrian regime forces, two points of the Syrian regime were shelled which forced the survivors to escape. We searched the point after that and found 12 dead bodies who had beards and were in their 30s and had headbands with the sentence: “Labyak Abdulfadl.”

   “We verified that all of them were affiliated to the Shiite faction Abdulfadl Al-Abbas brigade who fights with the Syrian regime and was in charge of the strategic location Mejbal Ash-Shaikh Najjar.”

2. **Ar-Rashdien front in Western Aleppo**

   A video footage was published on YouTube in which Iraqi Shiite fighters appear centralizing with the regime forces at Ar-Rashdien battlefronts in Western Aleppo. The video was published on 13 August, 2013 and it shows two Iraqi forces inside the Ar-Rashdien neighborhood.

3. **Salah Ad-Din neighborhood in Aleppo**

   Abafadl Al-Abbas brigade centralizes in Aleppo International Stadium. The brigade announced through posters that was put on the walls in Street no. 15 in Salah Ad-Din neighborhood that it now receiving new volunteers on 5 February, 2014. The brigade offered 35,000 S.P per month in addition to food aids as an attempt to exploit the needs of the refugees and the poor conditions of the residents.

4. **Khnaser in Southern Aleppo countryside**

   Mr. Haj Yassin spoke to SNHR member in Aleppo the lawyer “Muddary Yassin” about the massacre:

   “On 29 March, 2014 I heard a verbal argument between fighters from Abafadl Al-Abbas brigade and fighters from Syrain regime army who were centralized in Southern Aleppo countryside about a truck filled with sheep whom the Syrain regime confiscated from the biddu that live in the badia of Khnaser. The argument led to a gunfight in the southern market street where three Syrian regime fighters were killed and two Abalfadl Al-Abbas fighters were killed.”

   Mrs “Hasna Haj Yassin”, who lives in southern Aleppo countryside, talked with the lawyer “Muddar Yassin” about the massacre:

   “On Saturday 22 February, 2014 Abafadl Al-Abbas forces, which controls Khnasser, have perpetrated 26 young men who were previously arrested over the last week. On Saturday afternoon, the brigade took the young men out of the cultural center building, which is used by the brigade as a headquarter, to the square next to the center after covering their eyes. The fighters kept insulting them and accusing them of being terrorists and that they are the “Yazid sons” they lined them against the wall and opened fire heavily. Afterwards, they took the bodies to Shbieth Mountain, located near Al-Hammam town to the south of Khnaser, and buried it there. I didn’t witness the burying. However, residents told us about it. That area has become a mass grave where Abafadl Al-Abbas brigade bury the victims after executing and arresting them at its military checkpoints that are spread on Salmiya Athisra – Khnaser Aleppo road.”

2. **Rasm An-Nafl village in Aleppo countryside**

   SNHR talked with a survivor Mr. Hassan Aboud who lives in the village: “on Saturday 21 June, 2014 I was with my sheep herd on a hill about two Kilometers outside the village. When I got back, I found that the Syrian regime and its militias have took over the village and killed many of the residents, children, women, men, and elderly. I managed to escape with my family after two hours and I saw men that were wearing black suits and yellow headbands (apparently from Hezbollah). Those men killed a 90-year-old woman that was sitting in her house alone and then they destroyed the house with the dead body inside. Many families gathered in one house, about 56-57 residents were there, they asked them to enter the rooms of the house and then they bombed the house and killed them all.”

   “I watched three bodies for three children; one of whom was an infant, many dead bodies were scattered in the streets. After two months, FSA liberated the village and we went back and found tens of bodies thrown in the wells. We found also three mass graves. The number of the victims according to the residents was about 208 people who were all civilians.”

   SNHR talked also with Mr. Ammar Gabout the massacre of Rasm An-Nafl village:

   “I was in the village on Saturday 21 June, 2014. We heard that a group of Syrian regime fighters are on their way to the village. The residents fled away, which what we usually do when a group of Syrian regime fighters comes. We headed to an area that is two kilometers away from the village, a Syrian regime-affiliated militia came to us and told us that we have nothing to worry about and we can come back to the village. Some of the residents returned to the village. They gathered most of them in three houses and told them to wait until they can search them. Afterwards, they bombed the houses and killed all of them and collected the ashes... they betrayed them... they are criminals and murderers.”

   “What even is more horrible was what they do to the residents who returned and didn’t enter the houses they bombed; they arrested all of them, slaughtered them with knives, and threw their bodies in the wells. Some of the signs are still there and the wells also are still there.”
“After the massacre, they looted all our hoses. They took everything: gold, money, electric devices, cars, tractors, and other agricultural tools that they found. They also stole more than two thousand animals.”

SNHR documented the killing of 192 civilians that were killed in the Rasm Nafl village massacre in Aleppo countryside on 21 June, 2014 including 27 children and 21 women
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuNhVcZ2NUmmpQV/edit?usp=sharing

3- Al-Malkiya village
Ibrahim Al-Allawi, one of the survivors, told us about the massacre:
“On 27 March, 2013 groups of the Syrian regime forces and Shiite militias (we recognized them by their flags, dialect, and clothes) moved to open the road that lead to Ma’ameel Ad-Deifa’ near As-Sfierera after it was cut by the rebels. On their way they raided Al-Malkiya village, for no reason except for terrorizing the people, and executed dozens of them, tortured them, and burned their houses. Also, there was raping.”

SNHR documented the killing of 69 civilians that were killed on that day including five children and three women
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuOVc3SjNsTUNLW/edit?usp=sharing

4- Um Amoud village
On Wednesday 15 May, 2013, residents found 15 dead body inside a well in Um Amoud village, they told us (we couldn’t find an eyewitness) that the main suspect is Hezbollah militias as there a Hezbollah-affiliated military checkpoint near the village, located in eastern Aleppo countryside near As-Sfiera. A YouTube video footage shows the well while the residents with some experts are pulling out the bodies from inside.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUY11ggB2qQ

5- Al-Mazr’a village
On Sunday 21 July, 2013 Syrian regime forces, supported by Hezbollah militias, killed no less than 95 civilians from this small agricultural village including women and children, then they threw some of the bodies in a well and burned the rest. Mr. Hassan Ibrahim, a survivor, told SNHR:
“The Syrian regime forces and Hezbollah forces, whom we recognize from their dialect, clothes, and flags, Al-Mazr’a village, which is located next to the road that connects between Khnaser and Ma’ameel Ad-Deefa’a and whom they took over after it was controlled by the rebels. At the beginning, some of the residents managed to escape with their cars. However, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime started shell ing the cars with bullets which killed a guy. Afterwards, the officer in charge ordered to gather all the village residents in the big square.”
“After they gathered them, one of Hezbollah officers said: “bring me the youngest kid among you” then he slaughtered him in front of everybody including his mother, father, and brothers.”
“There were a woman who was scared to death for his son saying: “Please, everything but my son Omar... Please don’t kill him” he smiled and asked about Omar, she told him where he is he grabbed him from his head with his left hand and coldly slaughtered him and then he threw the head to the mother and said: “and now there is more Omar” the mother fainted immediately.”
“Then he ordered to cover everyone’s eyes with black blindfolds and put about 75 people in a large car and took them to a well.”
“while being blindfolded, one after another fell in the well; there was a guy who was holding his seven-month kid after they threw everyone in the well, they poured fuel and burned everybody inside the well. The well is known and you can visit it to check by yourselves.”
“There were other 25 people who the officer ordered to be gathered in a house and burned them all. The bodies are still inside the house to this moment.”
A YouTube video showing an interview with one of the survivors in which he said that one day before the massacre the Syrian army came and prepared everything for Hezbollah, which didn’t find any resistance.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toCh6i-vNg
In total, SNHR documented that 250 people were killed in this massacre; all of whom were civilians.
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuZGQtYndkVjNFZms/edit

6- Tal Shaghib in Aleppo countryside near As-Sfiera
On Friday 13 March, 2013 Hezbollah militias executed five people whose bodies were found by Al-Adnaniya village. It appears that those five victims were rebels whom Hezbollah arrested. Video footage shows the bodies.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiSTa_DbIko&feature=youtu.be

Lootings

After killing, executing, and massacres in southern and eastern Aleppo countryside, and after the families fled away and leave their homes, the Shiite militias loot the houses which was the case in (Khnaser, Al-Hammam, Al-Qarabatiya, Hajira, Ibeda, Um Mayyal, Um Amoud, Al-Qebti, Al-J Unaid, Az-Zarra’a, Al-Malkiya, Al-Adnaniya, and As-Sfiera villages and towns) In some other towns (Tal Ar, Tal Hasel, Kabbara, Tal Alam, and Blat) Abdulfadl Al-Abbas militias took over the houses and settled in it.
With the Syrian revolution taking the armed form and the factions evolving to become semi-organized military, the local rebel factions managed in 2012 to take over most of the areas that incubated the revolution in the countryside and the main cities itself as the rebels liberated a large portion of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus cities. This significant advance with the large increase in the number of victims and the Syrian regime resorting more and more to sectarian massacres in light of a shrinking possibility to find a political solution have all led to changing the conflict from a discourse standpoint to become more sect-based. Furthermore, the Syrian regime found on the regional level a stronger political, economic, and military base that supplied it with fighters and weapons unlike the Syrian opposition which couldn’t find the same amount of support.

The Syrian regime, taking advantage of the fact that it is the Arabic backbone of the Iranian Regional Project and the nature of the Syrian revolution that relied heavily on the Sunni component in addition to adopting the Syrian case in the media by the Arabic entities that are threatened by the Iranian project, regionalized and sectarianized the Syrian conflict in order to mass and recruit thousands of Iraqi fighters in addition to Hezbollah fighters and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards experts who have managerial roles in the Syrian army since before the revolution. All of this helped the Syrian regime to regain a significant portion of the rebels’ areas in Damascus countryside, Homs, and Aleppo countryside. The Syrian regime controls now most of the central region and is getting close to besiege the part of Aleppo that it doesn’t control.

The Syrian regime, in order to keep existing, relies on the Shiite militias supported by Iran where Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are the ones who run most of the big battlefronts. The majority of the killed fighters are Shiite militias. It looks like the Syrian regime is one of the participants in fighting the armed Syrian revolution and the Jihadist factions.

In conclusion, the numbers of non-Syrian Shiite fighters are at least four times more than the non-Syrians who are fighting with the rebels. The Shiite militias’ numbers are approximately 15-20 thousand fighters while Hezbollah have 7-10 thousand fighters and 5-7 thousand Afghani and Iranian fighters. The most important battles these militias had was in the southern neighborhoods the capital Damascus, Damascus countryside towns, and Al-Qalamoun in addition to besieging Eastern Ghouta and Aleppo battle that drains a notable amount of fighters and weapons. Furthermore, these Shiite militias are present in the battle at the Lebanese borders in Homs countryside and in most of the important battles in Hama countryside, Idlib, coastal areas, and Daraa.

In light of the most recent developments in Iraq, the Syrian map is changing whether it was through bigger displacing waves to Iraq or through Iran sending even more fighters to end the battle. Apparently, Syria will be affected the most politically and on the ground by the Iraqi scene on the regional and local level.

The Security Council
1- To consider the fighting Iraqi Shiite militias and the factions that sent them originally from Iraq, Lebanon, or Iran terrorist groups.
2- To ban the fly line between Iran and Syria or Iraq and Syria as civil aviation is the route used to send fighters to Syria by these factions.
3- To work on finding a political solution in Syria and Iraq as the two crises are clearly connected and are being cultivated by the Iranian leverage in both countries and its control over the regimes and security institution in both Iraq and Syria.

Human Rights Council and the International Investigation Committee
To coordinate and cooperate in order to document the perpetrated crimes by these militias through working on verifying all the visual materials received by their personnel and workers and put the involved on the wanted list and refer them to courts.

Ahmad Abazid, researcher at SNHR, is the one who worked on analyzing and documenting the phenomenon and map of the Shiite militias in Syria. This study was based on testimonies by rebels and residents who live in Shiite militias’ areas in addition to other testimonies by prisoners from these militias and the official statements and media materials published by these militias in newspapers, TV channels, and on the internet. It should be noted that we would like to thank the American researcher Philip Smith, who specialize in Hezbollah and Shiite militias, as we benefited substantially from his blog and also Mohammad Ash-Shaikh, who is actively interested in the fighting Shiite militias in Syria, as his observations and notes enriched this study. Also, our thank goes to the eyewitnesses victims’ families who helped in enriching this study and documenting crimes.
Qays Al-Khaza’aly – Sayid Ash-Shohada’ Brigades leader

The killed Mohammad Suleiman Al-Kooni – an African fighter with the Shiite groups

Funerals of victims of Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades

Funerals of victims of Ammar ben Yaser Brigade in Meesan governorate

The funeral of the killed Hussein Ali Al-Bahadli – Al-Nojaba Movement – Al-Hamd Brigade

The killed Mohammad Hussein Otry – the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

The killed General Hassan Shaien – the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Personnel of Badr Organization – the Military Wing

Personnel of Aspada-Allah Al-Ghalib Brigade

Personnel of Kafeel Zaynab Brigade

Personnel of Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade

Afghani Shiite victim – Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade

Personnel of Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade

Personnel of The Al-Faqir Brigade in Adra city

Personnel of The Al-Faqir Brigade

Personnel of Kafeel Zaynab Brigade

Personnel of Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade

Personnel of Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade

Multiple rocket launcher – Kafeel Zaynab Brigade

Multiple rocket launcher - Kafeel Zaynab Brigade

Journals of victims of Ammar ibn Yaser Brigade in Meesan governorate

Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade

Personnel of Assado-Allah Al-Ghaleb Brigade

Personnel of Tho Al-Faqir Brigade in Adra city

Personnel of Tho Al-Faqir Brigade

Personnel of Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade

The killed Fadel Sobhi, as known as Abu Hajar, the leader in Tho Al-Faqir Brigade

Multiple rocket launcher – Kafeel Zaynab Brigade

The killed Fadel Sobhi, as known as Abu Hajar, the leader in Tho Al-Faqir Brigade

The killed Mohammed Hussein Otry – the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Hajji Thamer – the Martyr Hasan Kayyara Company leader in Imam Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade

The killed Fadel Sobhi, as known as Abu Hajar, the leader in Tho Al-Faqir Brigade

The killed Fadel Sobhi, as known as Abu Hajar, the leader in Tho Al-Faqir Brigade

The killed Mohammed Hussein Otry – the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Hajji Kayyara – the Martyr Hasan Kayyara Company leader in Imam Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade

The funeral of the killed Husseine Ali Al-Sajadi – Al-Nojaba Movement – Al-Hamd Brigade

The funeral of the killed Husseine Ali Al-Sajadi – Al-Nojaba Movement – Al-Hamd Brigade
For more images you can visit these links:

The uniform of Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas personnel
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuUV5JWZlZlN3oHgE/edit?usp=sharing
Fighter of Al-Waa’d Ass-Sadeq Legion in Aleppo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuV0RUnFwNjML4g/edit?usp=sharing
Fighter of Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades while using mortar
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuVEF4W0D3Q1ZkQ0/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Al-Nojaba’a Movement—Al-Hand Brigade
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuT1h1c112OGYyD0/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Badr Movement
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuX2lJW36WVg4dU0/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Take’a Al-Khorasany Companies
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuRG9PVqgtc05HVU/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Take’a Al-Khorasany Companies
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuvtQKb0FmMVE/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Take’a Al-Khorasany Companies
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuGnV4SLSUShhMVE/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of SWAT Regiment under the leadership of Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuZ77QVh6NQdNlW/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of A-Waa’d Ass-Sadeq Legion
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuWHiRqJMVwVTCy/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Al-Waa’d Ass-Sadeq Legion
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMu5cZ1JrHZnWTV/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of the Martyr Mohammad Baqer Al-Sadiq Forces—Badr Organisation—the Military Wing
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMzG5dVrKvX6ZLLV/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuZdaWIPjLW0UW/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuZ2lJWpZpESV2pWd0k/edit?usp=sharing
Fighters of Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade in Eastern Ghouta
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuTK15VrMnRkDNeU0/edit?usp=sharing

Second: The Sectarian Massing Propaganda

Images showing Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades’ personnel insulting the opposition victims’ bodies
Third: Statements

Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade - The organizing statement

The statement of establishment of Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades - 8 May 2013

Fourth: Shiite Groups Logos

The Shiite groups logos

For more image you can visit this links

Taleea’a Al-Khorasany Companies logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuEEdw/VSNIQzbX/edit?usp=sharing

Al-Waa’d Ass-Sadeq Legion logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMueWY12CL3ripSQ2M/edit?usp=sharing

The Martyr Mohammad Baqer As-Sadr Forces - Badr Organization – the Military Wing logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMaaGga2VoX0Kamc/edit?usp=sharing

Sayid Ash-Shohada’a Brigades logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuU1k2NnULUFS3Q/edit?usp=sharing

Imam Al-Hasan Al-Mojtaba Brigade logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuV2JkMkxMd2pFbms/edit?usp=sharing

Kafeel Zaynab Brigade, affiliated to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq logo
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMu0XlaVN5SmNCZjA/edit?usp=sharing

The Shiite groups logos with Khameni’s image
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuLXRoZ2palUIlbU0/edit?usp=sharing

The Shiite flags – Abo Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5pudHajcbMuJ4m9fWU/edit?usp=sharing